Entick v. Carrington held that the state is subject to the same laws of trespass as an individual – without permission from the owner or a law allowing entry, they cannot enter another's property.
On November 11, 1762, the defendants, Nathan Carrington and three others, entered the plaintiff's home with a warrant issued by the British Secretary of State, the Earl of Halifax. They were looking for written and printed materials related to the periodical, The Monitor, which may have contained seditious libels against the king's government and Parliament. John Entick, the plaintiff, was a writer for The Monitor. In executing the warrant, the defendants "broke open the boxes, chests, drawers, etc. of the plaintiff," breaking locks and searching every room of the house. The search lasted four hours. Carrington and his associates seized a large quantity of Entick's writings and brought them, along with the plaintiff, to the Secretary of State. Entick complained of being deprived of the use of his home and brought suit, arguing that the entry was a trespass. In response, the defendants argued that the search and seizure were both lawful because they were acting under a warrant received from the Secretary of State.
The court ruled for Entick, finding that Carrington and his associates committed a trespass because they did not have legal authority or the plaintiff's consent to enter or search the property. Although the defendants had a warrant, Statute 24 Geo. 2 required that warrants be issued by a justice of the peace. The Secretary of State was not a justice of the peace and therefore did not have the legal authority to issue a warrant. Even though the defendants were state actors, they were still subject to the same property and trespass laws as everyone else. Because the warrant was invalid, Carrington and his associates did not have the right to be on the property and so committed a trespass in improperly seizing the writings.
The decision had an important influence on the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court discussed Entick as a "monument of English freedom” that was “the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law" and in the "minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution." Boyd at 626–27. Because of this, the principles discussed in Entick "were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 627. [1]
Authorities Cited:
The King v. Dr. Purnell, Vice Chancellor of Oxford (1748)
Citation(s): 96 English Reports 20; 1 Wilson's King's Bench and Common Pleas Reports 239
The government filed a criminal suit against the defendant, the Vice Chancellor of Oxford, for neglect of his duties as Vice-Chancellor and justice of the peace because he failed to punish two men for speaking "treasonable words in the streets of Oxford." As part of this proceeding, the government, without an affidavit, requested to review the university’s books, records, and archives. The question in this case was whether these records should be reviewable by the government in a criminal proceeding.
The court found that, because this case was "for a breach of and crime against the laws of the land," and because the request was to search records containing information about the defendant through his own corporation, the request would amount to the defendant furnishing evidence against himself. Citing similar cases, the court found that these records could not be searched.
The court in Entick relied on this case for the proposition that criminal defendants cannot be forced to furnish evidence against themselves. This supported the conclusion that the seizure of the pamphlets allegedly containing seditious libel was improper because they were the defendant’s personal property.
The King v. Cornelius (1744)
Citation(s): 93 English Reports 1133; 2 Strange's King's Bench Reports 1210
A government prosecutor sought to force the defendant’s corporation to reveal business documents relating to a misdemeanor the defendant was accused of committing.
The court found that the defendant could not be forced to produce the documents because it would be "in effect obliging a defendant indicted for a misdemeanor to furnish evidence against himself."
This case was used in Entick to support the point that parties cannot be forced to produce evidence against themselves without legal action.
Shergold v. Holloway (1735)
Citation(s): 93 English Reports 156; 2 Strange's King's Bench Reports 1002
John White, a third party, complained to the court that Shergold refused to pay him his earned wages. The justice of the peace ordered Holloway to bring Shergold in front of a court and to give notice to White. Holloway seized Shergold and took him in front of the court. In response, Shergold brought suit for improper arrest.
The court found that the justice "had no power to grant a warrant to apprehend the party," but only to issue a summons.
Therefore, the warrant and the arrest were invalid.
The court in Entick relied on Shergold for the statement that "a justice's warrant expressly to arrest the party will not justify the officer, there being no jurisdiction." This principle was used to support the conclusion that the warrant in Entick was invalid because it was not issued by a party with the proper authority.
Case of the Seven Bishops (1688)
Citation(s): 87 English Reports 136; 12 Howell's State Trials 183 (1688)
On June 29, 1688, seven high-ranking bishops of the Church of England were tried on charges of seditious libel for petitioning King James II for an exemption from the King’s order to read his Declaration of Indulgence (which authorized Catholics to hold public office and engage in other activities) during church services. At trial, the King argued that the Bishops should have fought the order through the courts or Parliament. The Bishops, however, argued that by petitioning the King they were exercising a common right held by all English subjects. At trial, the four judges were split 2-2 in their opinion of the law given to the jury on the issue of whether the Bishops committed seditious libel. The jury returned a verdict for the Bishops and against the King.
The court in Entick relied on the Case of the Seven Bishops.
In particular, they referred to the argument that "if a Secretary of State hath power to commit in high treason, he hath it in cases of lessor crimes: but this we deny, for it appears that he hath power to commit in one case only, how can we then without authority say he has that power in other cases?"
This helped the court to find that a warrant issued by an improper party is not effective.
More Resources:
- Christian Burset & T. T. Arvind, A New Report of Entick v. Carrington (1765), 110 Ky. L.J. 265 (2022).
1) See generally National Constitution Center, Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (last accessed March 28, 2024), (providing further detail on 4th amendment).
Return to text