Martin v. Herzog stands for the rule that violation of a statutory duty is negligence in itself. Such negligence imposes strict liability upon someone who violates a statutory duty when that violation results in the type of harm to another that the statute was intended to prevent.
Elizabeth Martin and her husband were driving after dark in a buggy when, at a curve in the highway, the buggy was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, Samuel Herzog. Mr. Martin was killed. At the time of the accident, Mr. Herzog’s car had crossed over into the wrong side of the highway, and the Martins were driving their buggy without lights, in violation of a state statute. At trial, Herzog argued that the Martins’ failure to have lights on their buggy constituted contributory negligence that negated Herzog’s liability for the accident. The trial court instructed the jury that they may consider the lack of the lights as evidence of negligence, but not conclusive evidence of negligence. The jury found that the Martins were not negligent and that Herzog was liable for Mr. Martin’s death. On appeal, Herzog claimed that the trial court had erred in this jury instruction.
Judge Benjamin Cardozo, in his majority opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, agreed that the trial court’s jury instruction was erroneous.
The court ruled that the Martins’ violation of the statute requiring lights to be used on vehicles after dark constituted negligence: “[w]e think the unexcused omission of the statutory signals is more than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence in itself.”
The Martins were negligent as a matter of law. The question should not have gone to the jury to decide. In a jurisdiction applying the rule of contributory negligence, as done here, the Martins’ failure to have lights on their buggy meant that they were unable to recover damages from the accident.
Authorities Cited:
Laidlaw v. Sage (1899)
Citation(s): 158 New York Reports 73
Laidlaw and Sage were businessmen who worked in an office building in New York City. One day, a man arrived at the office and handed Sage a letter that read, “The bag I hold in my hand contains ten pounds of dynamite. If I drop this bag on the floor, the dynamite will explode, and destroy this building in ruins, and kill every human being in the building. I demand $1,200,000, or I will drop the bag. Will you give it? Yes or no?” As Sage tried to calm the man down, he walked into his office and stood next to Laidlaw. The man dropped his bag, causing an explosion that destroyed the office, killing himself and several others. Right before the explosion, Sage put his hand on Laidlaw’s shoulder and repositioned him so that Laidlaw was standing between Sage and the intruder. Laidlaw sued Sage, claiming that his injuries were more severe than they would have been had Sage not used him to shield himself.
The issue for the New York Court of Appeals was whether Sage’s actions were the proximate cause of Laidlaw’s injuries. The court held in favor of Sage, ruling that the explosion, not Sage’s actions, was the proximate cause of the injuries. They found that “nothing which the defendant did could have produced the injury sustained by the plaintiff without another independent intervening cause.” Laidlaw v. Sage is cited in the dissent to Martin v. Herzog for the proposition that even if the Martins’ failure to have lights on their buggy was negligence per se, “it would not bar a recovery by plaintiff, unless such contributory negligence was the proximate and not a remote contributory cause of the injury.”
The Pennsylvania (1873)
Citation(s): 86 U.S. 125
The Pennsylvania involved a collision between two British ships on the high seas off the coast of Sandy Hook. The two ships were traveling through dense fog and the Pennsylvania struck the smaller ship, the Mary Troop, sinking it and killing several aboard. Both ships were found to have been at fault: the Pennsylvania because it had been traveling faster than the conditions allowed, and the Mary Troop because it had been ringing a bell rather than blowing a foghorn, in violation of maritime law. The question for the court was whether the Mary Troop’s failure to use a foghorn contributed to the collision, and thus, whether the Pennsylvania would be held liable for damages.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Pennsylvania’s unreasonable speed would have caused a collision even if the Mary Troop had been blowing a foghorn. Thus, the Mary Troop’s violation was not a contributory cause of the accident, and the Pennsylvania was liable for damages. The issues in The Pennsylvania are similar to those in Martin v. Herzog, but the two cases have different outcomes. In such cases, where one party has violated a statutory duty, the burden is on the offending party to show that their statutory violation played no meaningful part in the accident or injury in dispute. In the case of The Pennsylvania, the owners of the Mary Troop were able to prove that their failure to blow a foghorn would not have affected the outcome of the two ships colliding. In Martin v. Herzog, Mrs. Martin was unable to prove that her failure to use lights on her buggy played no part in the collision that killed her husband.
More Resources:
Amberg v. Kinley (1919)
Citation(s): 214 New York Reports 541
Amberg v. Kinley was binding precedent in New York at the time Martin v. Herzog was decided. W. Amberg was employed in a tannery owned by Kinley. Amberg was working in a drying loft when a fire broke out, killing him and destroying the building. A state labor law required such factory buildings to have fire escapes, but the tannery did not have any. Amberg’s widow sued for damages resulting from his death. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant’s negligence “is established as a matter of law by his failure to provide a fire escape,” and that the only question was whether this negligence was the cause of the accident. The jury ruled for Amberg, and Kinley appealed the decision to the New York Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision, finding that the failure to provide fire escapes, in violation of the labor law, constituted not just evidence of negligence, but conclusive proof of liability. Judge Cardozo, in his majority opinion for Martin v. Herzog, cited Amberg v. Kinley as establishing the rule that “to omit, willfully or heedlessly, the safeguards prescribed by law for the benefit of another that he may be preserved in life or limb, is to fall short of the standard of diligence to which those who live in organized society are under a duty to conform.”
The Famous Squib Case – Scott v. Shepard (1773)
Citation(s): 96 English Reports 525
Shepard, the defendant, tossed a squib (a small explosive device) into a crowded market in Somerset, England. The squib landed on the table of a merchant, who quickly picked it up and tossed it away from himself. The squib landed in the goods of a second merchant, who grabbed it and threw it again, accidentally hitting the plaintiff, Scott, in the face just as the squib exploded. Scott lost an eye in the explosion and brought suit against Shepard.
At trial, Shepard argued that he was not responsible for Scott’s injuries, since at least two other people had thrown the squib after it left Shepard’s hands. A majority of the King’s Bench disagreed, holding him fully liable. The court reasoned that a person who commits an unlawful act must be held liable for all consequences of that act, however attenuated. Although Shepard was not the one who threw the squib into Scott’s face, it was Shepard who set the chain of events in motion. As put by Justice Nares: “He is the person who, in the present case, gave the mischievous faculty to the squib. That mischievous faculty remained in it until the explosion... [H]e who does the first wrong is answerable for all the consequential damages.”
