Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.

Citation(s): 3 King's Bench 560

Furness chartered a ship owned by Polemis and Boyazides. Due to rough weather during transit, some of the ship’s cargo had leaked, resulting in a buildup of flammable vapor in the hold upon its arrival at its destination. A stevedore, hired by Furness to help unload the ship, accidentally dropped a plank into the hold, causing a spark that resulted in a fire, which destroyed the entire ship. When the ship’s owners sued for damages, Furness argued that although the dropping of the plank had been negligent, he should not be held liable for the entire loss because the loss of the ship was not a foreseeable outcome. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that when conduct is found to be negligent, the actor is liable for all consequences directly resulting from that conduct, no matter how unforeseeable.

Matter of Polemis was cited by both Judge Cardozo in the majority opinion and Judge Andrews in his dissent. Cardozo held that the railroad employees in Palsgraf were not liable because their conduct was not negligent, but he cited Polemis to support his belief that a finding of negligence “would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary.” Andrews cited Polemis for the proposition that the “act being wrongful the doer was liable for its proximate results.” Matter of Polemis’s strict liability theory of negligence has since been disapproved of by British common law courts in favor of a more lenient proximate cause standard, but it has never been explicitly overruled. 

Citation(s): 224 New York Reports 47; 120 North Eastern Reporter 86

In  Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, decided ten years before Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo also considered the issue of proximate cause. A fire broke out at a freight yard, eventually spreading to reach a large quantity of stored dynamite. The dynamite ignited, causing a huge explosion, which generated a “concussion of the air” that damaged the plaintiff’s boat over 1,000 feet away from the freight yard. The boat had been insured against damage caused by fire, among other hazards, and the plaintiff sued his insurance carrier to obtain compensation for his losses. The insurance company argued that since no fire had reached the boat, the freight yard fire was not the proximate cause of the boat’s damages.

Judge Cardozo sided with the insurance company, finding that the chain of causation was too attenuated to ascribe the boat’s damages to the fire at the freight yard. According to Cardozo, the boat was so remote in space compared to the fire that caused the explosion that such an occurrence would not have been contemplated by the plaintiff or the insurance company when they agreed to their insurance policy. This focus on remote, unforeseeable consequences was echoed later in Palsgraf, when Judge Cardozo once again found a chain of unlikely events were too remotely connected to give rise to liability for negligence. Bird was cited by Cardozo and Andrews in their Palsgraf opinions when discussing proximate cause.

Citation(s): 82 United States Supreme Court Reports 524

A shipment of nitroglycerine was sent via Wells Fargo from New York to San Francisco. When the shipment arrived at the San Francisco wharf, it was found to be leaking and was brought to the Wells Fargo Office for inspection. When workers at the office attempted to open the crate, the nitroglycerine exploded, killing several people and severely damaging the building. The owner of the building in which Wells Fargo had been renting its office space sued for negligence.

The Circuit Court for the District of California ruled that the defendants were not liable for any damage caused by the explosion to other portions of the plaintiff’s buildings leased to and occupied by other tenants. The plaintiff then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Wells Fargo had not been negligent in bringing the crate to its offices and attempting to open it, because the crate had no labels warning of its contents. Furthermore, nitroglycerine was a newly-discovered compound (only discovered in 1866), and its dangerous properties were not widely known or understood. The Nitro-Glycerine Case is cited alongside Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railroad Company by Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf for the principle that “negligence is the absence of care, according to the circumstances.”

Citation(s): 157 English Reports 1351; 5 Hurlstone & Norman's Exchequer Reports 679

Vaughan, the plaintiff, was the owner of some wooded land adjacent to a railway line owned by the Taff Vale Railway Company. One day, he received word that his woods were on fire and that the evidence clearly showed that the fire had started at the railway tracks and spread to his property. He brought suit against the railway company, seeking damages for negligence. 

At the first trial, the judge instructed the jury that if the fire was shown to have resulted from sparks emitted by a locomotive, the railway company would be liable for any damages that were a consequence of the fire. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeal noted that accidental fires are a natural and probable consequence of the operation of locomotives. Accordingly, railroads cannot be held liable for negligence after they have taken all practical precautions to prevent fire, because negligence requires failure to perform a particular duty; the railroad ensured proper care was exercised in fulfilling their duty.

Judge Cardozo quoted Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company for the proposition that “negligence is the absence of care, according to the circumstances.” Applying this rule to the facts of Palsgraf, the Long Island Railway employees were not negligent because the circumstances did not indicate any danger of an explosion resulting from their actions. Since the railway employees had no reason to know that the falling package could harm someone far away, like Ms. Palsgraf, they did not fail in their duty of care.