Byrne v. Boadle is commonly cited as an early and important precedent for the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Under res ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”), a plaintiff can create a rebuttable presumption of negligence by showing that the harm that occurred is of a type that would not ordinarily occur without negligence, that the instrument that caused the harm was under the defendant’s exclusive control, and that no other plausible explanation for the harm exists. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, first applied outside the railroad industry in Byrne v. Boadle, remains an important common law doctrine to this day.
Boadle was the owner of a warehouse that stored barrels of flour, among other goods. The warehouse was located alongside a road, from which barrels could be hoisted to the upper floors by using a rope and pulley. Byrne was walking along this road past the warehouse when a barrel of flour fell and struck him on the head, permanently injuring him. Several witnesses saw the barrel fall and strike Byrne, but none had a view of what had caused the barrel to fall. Byrne himself had no memory of the incident.
When Byrne first sued Boadle for damages, the court issued a directed verdict in Boadle’s favor, because Byrne could present no direct evidence of Boadle’s negligence. Upon appeal, the Court of Exchequer ruled that there was enough circumstantial evidence to support a conclusion that Boadle’s negligence had caused the accident. Judge Pollock wrote in his opinion, “A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must call witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to me preposterous.”
Authorities Cited:
Cotton v. Wood (1860)
Citation(s): 141 English Reports 1288; 8 Common Bench Reports 568
Cotton v. Wood was a negligence case arising from an accident where a carriage owned by the defendant struck and killed Mary Cotton while she was crossing the road. At the moment the accident occurred, Cotton was crossing “not at any ordinary crossing-place,” and the driver of the carriage had turned around to speak to the conductor. The administrator of Cotton’s estate brought suit against Wood for negligence. When the jury returned a verdict in favor of Cotton, the judge invalidated the verdict for being against the weight of the evidence. The evidence tended to show that the carriage driver’s momentary turning of his attention from the road was no more negligent than Cotton’s crossing the road at an unexpected place after dark. The appeals court, however, found that the trial court had erred. It dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and ruled that “where the evidence is equally consistent with either view–with the existence or non-existence of negligence–it is not competent to the judge to leave the matter to the jury.”
The defendant in Boadle cited Cotton v. Wood to qualify the doctrine of presumptive negligence, arguing that the judge should decide a case when the evidence equally supported the existence of negligence or a lack of it.
Skinner v. The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company (1850)
Citation(s): 154 English Reports 1476; 5 Exchequer Reports 787
Skinner v. The London involved a collision between two trains on a railway line. Skinner, a passenger on one of the trains, was injured when his train struck another train that was idling at the station on the same track. Skinner sued the railway company for damages, claiming that the company’s negligence had caused the accident. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that “the fact of the accident having occurred was of itself prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants.” After the court ruled in favor of Skinner, the railway company appealed, arguing that Skinner had presented no evidence showing that the accident was the result of negligence. On appeal, the court upheld the earlier decision. Since the railway company was responsible for both of the trains as well as the track, the company’s negligence could be inferred as a matter of law.
On questioning by Justice Pollock, Boadle’s attorneys acknowledged the precedent set by Skinner that an accident’s occurrence can be evidence of negligence in and of itself, but they sought to limit Skinner’s application to the facts of that case alone. The court saw otherwise and applied the logic in Skinner to Byrne v. Boadle.
Carpue v. The London and Brighton Railway Company (1844)
Citation(s): 5 Queen's Bench 747
Carpue, a passenger on the London and Brighton Railway, was injured when a train derailed. Carpue sued for negligence, claiming that the railway company had not exercised due and proper care and skill. At trial, he submitted evidence that the tracks at the point where the train derailed were “deranged,” making it unsafe for the train to travel at its normal speed. The court ruled that this evidence was sufficient to send the question of negligence to the jury and instructed the jury that they could presume the railroad company was negligent, since the railroad had “exclusive management” of the train and rails when the accident had occurred.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Carpue. The railroad defendant then appealed the verdict based in part on the contention that the jury instruction on the presumption of negligence was improper. On appeal, Charles Pollock argued the plaintiff's case as a government attorney-general, less than a year before he was named to the Exchequer bench. The judges of the Queen's Bench agreed with Pollock that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of negligence to take his case to the jury. The presumption of negligence concept that was applied in Carpue was restricted to cases involving railroad companies until it was applied in Byrne v. Boadle and coined as res ipsa loquitur.
Christie v. Griggs (1809)
Citation(s): 170 English Reports 1088; 2 Campbell's Nisi Prius Cases 79
Christie was a passenger on a stagecoach that was owned by Griggs. The stagecoach broke down during the journey, throwing Christie to the ground and greatly bruising him. Christie sued Griggs for negligence. At trial, Christie was able to show that the axletree of the stagecoach had snapped but otherwise presented no direct evidence of negligence on the part of Griggs or his employees. Griggs argued that the burden was on Christie as the plaintiff to produce evidence of negligence beyond the mere fact of the accident having occurred, such as the driver being unskillful. The court held that the stagecoach breaking down was sufficient to infer negligence and shifted the burden to Griggs to prove that negligence was not involved. Griggs had the burden of proof to show Christie’s injuries “arose from what the law considers a mere accident.” The jury found in favor of Griggs.
In Byrne v. Boadle, Boadle made a similar argument to Griggs, claiming that the burden of proof was on Byrne to show negligence. In both cases, the court held that once the plaintiff showed that the accident had occurred and that it was the type of accident that would not normally occur in the absence of negligence, it then fell on the defendant to prove that negligence was not the cause of the accident.