The Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to privileges and immunities guaranteed by the federal, not the state, government.
The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery and involuntary servitude in different forms, but it does not guarantee economic freedom or equal economic opportunities, as argued by the plaintiffs in response to a Louisiana law that restricted their trade and created a monopoly. [1]
After a series of cholera and yellow fever outbreaks, the Louisiana state legislature banned all slaughterhouses and livestock landings within New Orleans and the city’s vicinity. According to the act, Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughterhouse Company became the area’s exclusive landing and slaughtering site. All other slaughterhouses in the New Orleans vicinity would have to close, and independent butchers would have to conduct their business at Crescent City’s grand slaughterhouse.
A group of local butchers sued the state of Louisiana, arguing that this statutory scheme violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment. According to the butchers, by forcing them to close down their independent slaughterhouses, the Louisiana legislature took away the butchers’ “privilege” of carrying on in their once-lawful commerce without suppression by state-sanctioned monopolies. Additionally, the butchers argued that requiring them to operate in Crescent City’s slaughterhouse was a form of “involuntary servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court disagreed with both arguments and affirmed the statute as constitutional.
The narrow holding of Slaughterhouse effectively ended Privileges and Immunities arguments in civil rights cases; later civil rights arguments and decisions were instead based on the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Authorities Cited:
In re Turner (1867)
Citation(s): 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C. Maryland) (1867)
When the Thirteenth Amendment went into effect, former slaves were rounded up by the residents of Talbot County, Maryland, and forced to become apprentices of their former masters. One of these apprentices was Elizabeth Turner, a former slave of Philemon Hambleton. Turner was an apprentice in name only. Unlike the white apprentices, she was denied a basic education, and she could also be “assigned and transferred” at Hambleton’s will. The Turner Court found that this “apprenticeship” was just a facade for involuntary servitude, and thus was unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Slaughterhouse Court cited this case against the butcher’s argument that restricting their operations to the grand slaughterhouse was an imposition of “involuntary servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. The term “involuntary servitude” was included in the Amendment’s language to prohibit simply any form of antebellum slavery under the guise of a new name, like Turner’s “apprenticeship.”
City of New York v. Miln (1837)
Citation(s): 36 U.S. 102 (11 Peters 102)
The beginning of the nineteenth century saw a massive influx of European immigrants into the United States, especially to the port of New York. In 1824, the New York Legislature passed a statute that required all ships arriving from foreign ports to provide detailed ship manifests, with a list of passengers including their age, occupation, last place of settlement, and place of birth. This information would be used to determine whether to admit the immigrants on board. The master of the ship Emily failed to file the report required by the statute. The City sued George Miln, the ship owner, for $15,000 as a non-compliance penalty. Miln argued that the New York statute was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because it regulated interstate commerce, which is exclusively regulated by the federal government.
The Miln Court disagreed and instead characterized the statute as a valid use of New York’s police powers. The Court remarked that the emigration of “civilized Europeans” to “an independent country, controlled by a civilized people” was a uniquely American phenomenon. As such, New York had the right, as is “inherent in all communities,” to collect and use information to determine “how and when strangers are to be admitted” and to prevent “the introduction of foreign paupers” that were likely to become charges of the state.
The Slaughterhouse Court acknowledged that the Louisiana statute, like the New York statute, had an indirect connection to interstate commerce. However, the purpose of both statutes revealed a direct exercise of police powers, rightfully belonging to the state legislatures.
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
Citation(s): 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheaton 1)
Aaron Ogden was assigned a license granted by the State of New York giving him the right to navigate the waters connecting New Jersey and New York. Thomas Gibbons, a personal as well as business rival, [2] also obtained an exclusive right to operate in New York waters. However, his license was granted by the federal government. The Gibbons Court nullified Ogden’s state license and upheld the federal license as superior. This was the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to affirm Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
The Slaughterhouse Court cited Gibbons to exemplify privileges granted by the state and those granted by the federal government. In Gibbons, the conflict was an interstate issue, subject to the power of the federal government, thus invoking the protections granted by the Constitution's 14th amendment. In contrast, Slaughterhouse was an intrastate issue: it invoked neither the power of the federal government nor the 14th Amendment’s protection of privileges and immunities.
Corfield v. Coryell (1823)
Citation(s): 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pennsylvania) (1823)
Under an 1820 New Jersey statute, only New Jersey residents could harvest oysters and clams in the state’s waters. When Corfield, an out-of-state resident, was caught oystering in New Jersey waters, state authorities seized and auctioned off his ship. Corfield brought suit, claiming that New Jersey was violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV [3] by excluding out-of-state residents from enjoying the state’s common property.
The Corfield court ruled the New Jersey state law constitutional because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not entitle out-of-state residents to enjoy the same rights offered to state residents. Rather, privileges and immunities are those fundamental to citizenry in a free, independent, and united government. The Corfield Court was unconvinced that the privilege of access to oyster beds was fundamental to the establishment of such a government.
The Slaughterhouse Court cited Corfield to support their claim that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require economic privileges of state citizenship to be uniform. Rather, there were only certain privileges attached to federal citizenship–those deemed “fundamental” to citizenry that can invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.